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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, 
Plaintiff and Appellee 
vs. 
KENNETH PIPKIN, 
Defendant and Appellant, Pro Se 
On Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Utah, 
Washington County, St George Department, 
Case No. 110500860 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Defendant/Appellant requests oral arguments. 
JOHNSON MARK LLC 
P.O. Box 7811 
Sandy, Utah 84091 
KENNETH 
P. O. Box mi 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 4 
Cases ' 4 
Rules 4 
Statutes .5 
Other Authorities .5 
Prior or Related Appeals 5 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT. ...5 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES (WITH CITATIONS) 6 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 9 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 9 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 9 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 12 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION WITHOUT 
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DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S RIGHTS AND REQUESTS FOR 
VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED DEBT PURSUANT TO FDCPA....12 
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD NEGLECTED TO CEASE 
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE PRESENTING ALLEGED CONTRACT 
TO SUPPORT SAID CLAIM 15 
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4. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD PRODUCED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE ATTACHED TO AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56(e) TO ESTABLISH A 
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STATEMENT OF T H E ISSUES 
1. Did die District Court err in its decision without considering Plaintiff/Appellee 
had violated Defendant /Appellant's Rights and requests for verification of 
alleged debr Pursuant to FDCPA? Seepage. 5, Answer to Complaint "Defendant 
requested information listed on 1SI Request for ORIGINAL Documentation 
and ORIGINAL contracts from Plaintiff on Date of June 18, 2010 (Copy 
attached as Exhibit "A")". See page. J.7, Memorandum in Support of Motion in 
Opposition to Motion for Sumrmiy Judgment. ".. .Pursuant to the Fair Debt 
Collections Practices Act (FDCPA), there has been no documented evidence of 
alleged debt provided to Defendant by Plaintiff or any affiliated parties, alleged 
debt is null and void. Defendant has no access to information regarding alleged 
debt". See Exhibits '14 " through *£ ". 
2. Did the District Court err in its decision after Plaintiff/Appellee had neglected 
to cease collection activity after Defendant/Appellant had requested name and 
address of original creditor Pursuant to FDCPA? Seepage 50* Motion to Dismiss 
"Defendant has repeatedly requested Evidence of alleged debt Pursuant to Fair-
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which gives Defendant certain Rights 
under FDCPA. Seepage 65. Motion for Reconsideration. 'Defendant states that, to 
date as of this Motion, Plaintiff has disregarded Defendant's requests to 
produce to Defendant: (1) Documented evidence of alleged debt, (2) name and 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
address of original creditor and (3) name and address of current creditor(s). 
Although Plaintiff neglected to produce any of requested evidence and address 
information, Plaintiff failed to cease collection of alleged debt. Defendant's first 
request was timely mailed to Plaintiff as required in FDCPA requirements': See-
page 113, Alotion for E^edited Post-Judgment Hearing. 'Defendant also requests the 
Court to consider Plaintiffs disregard of Defendant's Rights Pursuant to 
FDCPA as Defendant mailed, via Certified Mail, a request for original contract 
and name and address of original creditor, as well as name and address of 
current creditor". See Exhibits '14" thro?/gb ' £ " 
3. Did the District Court err m holding that, Pursuant to Rule 56(c), 
Plaintiff/Appellee had succeeded in "showpng] that there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact" after Defendant/Appellant raised questions regarding 
Plaintiff/Appellee's allegations of "Breach of Contract", without 
Plaintiff/Appellee presenting alleged contract to support said claim? Seepage 3"7f 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
"Defendant does not dispute validity of age, competency or employment of 
Affiant Affiant's affidavit does not provide documented evidence of alleged 
debt therefore is irrelevant". See 'bams 52 and 53, Re&Iv to Plaintiffs Qbbositioii to 
Motion to Dismiss. "Regarding Plaintiffs alleged "Breach of contract claim", (1) 
no contract has been provided to Defendant, or the Court (to Defendant's 
knowledge) as evidence of alleged debt, (2) Plaintiff has repeatedly disregarded 
7 
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Defendant's requests for evidence of alleged debt showing poor performance 
by the party (Plaintiff) seeking alleged recovery, (3) no evidence of alleged debt, 
namely "an original contract", has been provided to Defendant to support 
Plaintiffs alleged "breach of contract by (any) p&ny", and (4) there has been no 
evidence of alleged debt presented to support alleged "damages"..... Therefore, 
as "not remembering" alleged debt is not evidence that alleged debt does not 
exist. Plaintiff alleging that alleged debt exists, without providing or presenting 
evidence of alleged debt, also is not evidence that alleged debt exists.". 
4. Did the District Court err in holding that Plaintiff/Appellee had produced 
sufficient evidence attached to Affidavit Pursuant to Rule 56(e) to establish a 
prima facie case? Seepage 24, Affidavit qfMycah Struck, "I have access to and have 
reviewed the records pertaining to...". See Exhibit "A"ofPlaintiff/,appellee's 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion tor Summary Judgment Pages 18 through 
24, Seepage 126, Reply in Support of^Motion forExpeditedPost'-JudgmentHearing. 
"Defendant submits the same argument because Plaintiff has failed and 
continues to fail to present original contract winch Plaintiff accuses Defendant 
of Breaching. In order for there to be a breach of contract, there must be a 
contract in existence, winch Plaintiff has failed to present to create a prima 
facie case." 
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Although Defendant/Appellant preserved the above issues in the Trial Court, 
Defendant/Appellant feels that the above issues were ignored and unpreserved by 
the Plaintiff/Appellee and/or the ludge. Therefore, Defendant/Appellant requests 
the Court of Appeals to review the above non-preserved issues. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a simple case where Plaintiff/Appellee has failed to form a Prima Facie 
case and has violated Defendant/Appellant's Rights Pursuant to FDCPA. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or around May 30, 2010, Defendant/Appellant received letter from 
Plaintiff/Appellee's Attorney, Johnson Mark, Attorneys at Law (hereafter 
"Attorney'). Letter, attached as Exhibit iCE'\ was dated May 2~, 2010 and states, in 
part, "....Federal law gives you thirty days after vou receive this letter to dispute the 
validity of the debt or any part of it .If you do dispute it. bv notifying our firm in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i 
writing to that effect, we will, as required by law, obtain and mail YOU proof of the 
debt. And if, within the same period, you request in writing the name and address of ( 
vour original creditor, if the original creditor is different from the current creditor, we 
will furnish you with that information too... „ Jf, however vou request proof of the 
debt or the name and address of the original creditor within the thirtv-dav period that 
begins with your receipt of this letter, the law requires our firm to suspend our efforts 
to collect the debt (through a lawsuit, arbitration, or otherwise) until we mail the 
requested information to vou." 
On June 18, 2010 Defendant/Appellant mailed, via certified mail to 
Plaintiff/Appellee's Attorney, a letter (submitted as Exhibit C£A" in District Court) 
requesting oroof of alleged debt, along with name and address of original creditor. No 
response was received bv Defendant/Appellant until, on March 7, 2011, nearly a year 
later, a Complaint and summons was served on Defendant/Appellant's father, while 
Defendant/Appellant was in Texas visiting family. Defendant/Appellant filed Answer 
to Complaint on March 28, 2011. 
On Mav 10, 2011, Defendant /Appellant received a letter from 
Plaintiff/Appellee's Attornev requesting a Pre-Tnal Conference. Certificate of Mailing 
on letter was tvped "On April 21, 2011,1 mailed " and the 21 was crossed off with 
pen and "26" was hand-written above the typed "21". Postmark on the envelope 
containing the letter was 05/05/11. Subsequently, Defendant/Appellant received a 
10 
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letter from the District Court, postmarked 05/11/11, on May 13, 2011. Tins "Notice 
of Pre-Tnal Conference" was addressed, incorrectly, to Defendant./Appellant's 
phvsical address: 675 N Lavntzen St #3 , Hildale, UT 84784. Correct physical address 
is: 675 N Lauritzen St.. Hildale UT 84784. U. S. Post Office usually delivers to: P. O. 
Box 842272, Hildale UT 84784, yet Defendant/Appellant did, in fact, receive the 
"Notice of Pre-Trial Conference" letter from the District Court. 
On June 9, 2011, at the Pre-Trial Conference, Defendant/Appellant notified 
the District Court judge that no response to Defendant/Appellant's letter had been 
received. A representative for Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney stated that "requested 
information had been sent but was rejected by U. S. Post Office and returned'/ 
The following day, on June 10, 2011, Defendant/Appellant mailed, via certified 
mail to Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney, a "2nd Request and Demand....." (submitted as 
Exhibit tcB?? in District Court) which requested the information a second time, along 
with a "copy of allegedly rejected Postmarked envelope that allegedlv contained 
original evidence previousiv requested on June 18, 2010". Subject line of 
Defendant/Appellants letter also notified Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney that "This 
Demand is Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act". 
On or around July 7, 2011, Defendant/Appellant received Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Mycah Struck, Memorandum, Declaration of costs. 
11 
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I 
and Exliibit "A", general provisions of [non-specific] cardholder agreement from 
Plaintiff /Appellee's attorney. Defendant/Appellant filed Motion in Opposition to 
Summary judgment, along with Memorandum and Exhibits "A" through CT)'\ 
On or around July 21, 2011, Defendant /Appellant received Reply in Support 
of Summary Judgment, Request to Submit for Decision, and unsigned Summary 
Judgment. On July 21, 2011, Defendant/Appellant filed a Reply in Opposition for 
Motion for Summary judgment, Motion to Dismiss, and Order to Dismiss. 
On August 2, 2011, the District Judge, signed Plaintiff/Appellee's Summary 
Judgment. Defendant/Appellant filed additional motions, including: Motion for 
Reconsideration, Motion for Expedited Post-Judgment Hearing, and Notice of 
Appeal, among others. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANTS RIGHTS AND REQUESTS FOR 
VERIFICATION OF ALLEGED DEBT PURSUANT TO FDCPA. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FDCPA was created to protect consumers from unfair debt collection practices of 
debt collectors, including attorneys. See HEINTZ et al. v. JENKINS, 514 U.S. 291 
(1995). In this case, Plaintiff/Appellee has violated FDCPA after 
Defendant/Appellant requested verification of alleged debt. See Fair Debt Collecnon 
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C §§ 1692-1692p. § 809. Validation of debts (a)(4), 
and (b). See attached Exhibits "A" through "D ? \ Defendant/Appellant has also 
verbally requested verification. Verification was requested by Defendant/Appellant, in 
writing, within 30 davs of date on letter from Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney. As of the 
date of this Brief, no contract or verification has been presented to 
Defendant/Appellant by Plaintiff/Appellee, as evidence, proof, or otherwise. 
Defendant/Appellant has. in fact, received numerous mailings pertaining to Motions 
with the Court from Plaintiff/Appellee. Therefore, Plaintiff/Appellee has correct 
address of Defendant/Appellant, yet Defendant/Appellant has not received 
information requested from Plaintiff/Appellee, Pursuant to FDCPA. Wherefore, 
Plaintiff/Appellee is in violation of FDCPA and case brought before the District 
Court is unlawful and, therefore, harassment. See Eric M. PICHT and Shavleen M. 
Picht, Plaintiffs, v. Jon R. HAWKS, George E. Warner and Ton R. Hawks, Ltd., 
Defendants., 77 F.Supp.2d 1041 (1999), "The FDCPA is a remedial strict Ikbilitv 
statute which was intended to be applied in a liberal manner.... Proof of deception or 
actual damages is not necessarv to make a recoverv under the FDCPA/' 
13 
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2. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION AFTER 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD NEGLECTED TO CEASE 
COLLECTION ACTIVITY AFTER DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAD 
REQUESTED NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORIGINAL CREDITOR 
PURSUANT TO FDCPA. 
Plaintiff/Appellee has violated FDCPA after Defendant/ Appellant requested 
name and address of original creditor. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. f§ 1692-1692p. § 809. Validation of debts (a)(5) and (b). See 
attached Exhibits "A" through "D". Defendant/Appellant has also verbally requested 
information. Information was recmested, in writing-, within 30 davs of date on letter 
1 U - ' 
from Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney by Defendant/Appellant. See attached Exhibit 
"E". As stated in Plaintiff/'Appellee's letter, dated May 27, 2010, 'If, however you 
request proof of the debt or the name and address of the original creditor within the 
thirtv-dav period that begins with your receipt of tins letter, the law requires our firm 
to suspend our efforts to collect the debt (through a lawsuit, arbitration, or otherwise) 
until we mail the requested information to you." As of the date of this Brief, name 
and address of original creditor, as well as requested "proof have not been presented 
to Defendant/Appellant bv Plaintiff/Appellee, as evidence or otherwise, although 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiff/Appellee filed a lawsuit. Therefore, Plaintiff /Appellee is in violation of 
FDCPA. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, PURSUANT 
TO UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56(c), 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD SUCCEEDED IN «SHOW[ING] THAT 
THERE WAS N O GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT" 
AFTER DEFENDANT/APPELLANT RAISED QUESTIONS 
REGARDING PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S ALLEGATIONS OF 
"BREACH OF CONTRACT", WITHOUT PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
PRESENTING ALLEGED CONTRACT TO SUPPORT SAID CLAIM. 
Defendant/Appellant had, in fact, raised a genuine issue as to material fact in 
Defendant/Appellant's MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (page 37 in Trial 
Court records), among others, submitted in the District Court. "Defendant has no 
involvement with or any affiliation to MCM therefore has no familiaritv in regards bv 
which MCM creates and/or maintains its business records. Furthermore. Defendant 
has no access to information regarding alleged debt and cannot determine anv validitv 
of alleged debt without proper documented evidence of alleged debt as requested.'/ 
and "Defendant has no access and has not been provided with evidence of alleged 
15 
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debt therefore cannot determine anv alleged balance information or validity of alleged 
debt". See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). 
See John YORGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PITTSBURGH CORNING 
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 733 R2d 1215, "...we cannot accept as an 
absolute requirement that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file 
an affidavit in order to preserve issues adequately mentioned in the response and 
elsewhere. the party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that 
he is entided to judgment under established principles; and if he does not discharge 
that burden then he is not entitled to judgment. No defense to an insufficient showing 
is required/' 
See johnny STILES, Plaintiff v. HOME CABLE CONCEPTS, INC, et aL, 
Defendants. AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL CENTER, Plaintiff; v. 
Johnny STILES, Defendant. 994 F.Supp. 1410 (1998), where a contract was 
presented, as evidence, to remove "genuine issue of material fact". As of the date of 
this Brief, no contract or verification has been presented by Plaintiff/Appellee, as 
evidence or otherwise. 
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4. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAD PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
ATTACHED TO AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, RULE 56(e) TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE. 
See Rule 56. Summary judgment, (e) "..... Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith." In this case, Plaintiff/Appellee's only exhibit, exhibit "A'' attached to 
Affidavit were some general provisions of a non-specific cardmember agreement. 
Nothing in Plaintiff/Appellee's exhibit "A" mentioned Defendant/Appellant. 
Plaintiff/Appellee's Affiant, Mycah Struck, stated in Affidavit, ccl have access to and 
have reviewed the records pertaining to the account ' \ As such, no "records 
pertaining to the account7' were attached thereto or served therewith. 
See CELOTEX CORP. v. CATRETX ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE STATE 
OF CATRETT, 47" U.S. 317 (1986) "The burden of establishing the nonexistence of 
a "genuine issue" is on the part}' moving for summary judgment.. ..This burden has 
two distinct components; an initial burden of production, which shifts to the 
nonmoving party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate burden of 
persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. .. .The court need not deade 
whether the moving party has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion unless and 
until the court finds that the moving party has discharged its initial burden of 
17 
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I 
production.. .The burden of production imposed bv Rule 56 requires the moving 
part}' to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment75. 
CONCLUSION/RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant/Appellant prays that the Court will forgive Defendant /Appellant's 
lack of form, nature, and understanding as Defendant/Appellant is acting Pro Se out 
of necessity. Plaintiff/ Appellee has violated and continues to violate 
Defendant/Appellant's Rights Pursuant to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C U 1692-1692p. § 809.. Validation of debts (b). 
Defendant/Appellant requests the Court to consider and approach these violations 
with regard to Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. 
| 813. Civil liability. 
Further, Plaintiff /Appellee has failed to satisfy the burden of production 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, to make a prima facie shoving 
that it is entitled to summary judgment. Defendant/Appellant requests the Court to 
reverse summary judgment and dismiss tins case. 
In the event the Court is unable to reverse summary judgment and/or dismiss 
case, Defendant/Appellant requests the Court to order, or have District Court order 
Plaintiff/Appellee to present original signed contract as evidence and proof, provide 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
verification of alleged debt and name and address of original creditor, and remand 
case, to District Court for trial 
*f^ >\t (< 
Respectfully submitted tins (T"t day of December. 2011. 
Kenneth Pipkin, Pro Se 
P. O. Box 8422^2 
Hildale, UT 84"84 
19 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Kenneth Pipkin, hereby certify that on December <^0 2011,1 mailed TWO 
copies of Brief of the Appelant to: 
JOHNSON MARK LLC 
P . O . Box 7811 
Sandy, Utah 84091 
Kenneth Pipkin 
P. O. Bos 8422^2 
Hildale, UT 84"84 
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ATTACHMENTS 
Exhibit "A'\ Copv of Defendant, Appellant's "1st Request" for proof of [alleged] 
debt, name and address of original creditor, dated June 18, 2010. 
Exhibit "B*\ Copy of Defendant/Appellant's "'2nd Request and Demand" for proof 
of [alleged] debt, name and address of original creditor, dated June 10, 2011. 
Exhibits "C" and "D*\ Copies of Certified Receipts for deliverv confirmation of 
Exhibits "A" and 4CFV 
Exhibit "E'\ Copy of 1st letter from Plaintiff/Appellee's attorney, dated Mav 27 , 
2010 
21 
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KENNETH PIPKIN 
P.O. Box 842292 
Hildale, UT 84784 
June 18, 2010 
JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. Box 7811 
Sandy, UT 84091-7811 
RE: 1st Request for ORIGINAL Documentation and ORIGINAL contracts (Reference # 370024) 
This letter is in response to the letter sent to KENNETH PIPKIN from JOHNSON MARK LLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW on May 27, 2010.1 am requesting all ORIGINAL signed contract(s) (NO 
copies), ORIGINAL security agreement(s) (NO copies), and all correspondence between 
KENNETH PIPKIN and JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, HSBC 
BANK NEVADA, N.A., and ANY other parties involved (collectively "all parties"). I am also 
requesting correspondence (including documentation of verbal correspondence) between "all 
parties". 
Additionally, I am requesting the name and address of the original creditor, the name and 
address of the current creditor and ANY previous, current or future creditor(s), including "all 
parties". 
! am also requesting the Total Amount Due, as of the date a reply is mailed. 
Please mail all documentation, contracts, and correspondence within 30 days from receipt of 
this letter. If no reply is sent, we will assume this matter is closed. 
tfwwf? ftlfKh 
Agent for KENNETH PIPKIN 
CERTIFIED RFCFIPT # 7009 2250 0003 2205 4542 
1 OF 2 ORIGINAL REQUESTS (2 N D ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF SENDER) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EtkV- u 8h 
KENNETH PIPKIN CERTIFIED RECEIPT#7010 tizlQ 000} 0*92 tW 
P.O. Box 842272 1 OF 2 ORIGINAL REQUESTS (2N D ORIGINAL IN POSSESSION OF SENDER) 
Hildale, UT 84784 
June 10,2011 
JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. Box 7811 
Sandy, UT 84091-7811 
RE: 2nd Request and Demand for ORIGINAL Documentation and ORIGINAL contracts (Reference 
# 370024). This Demand is Pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 
This letter is in response to the letter sent to KENNETH PIPKIN from JOHNSON MARK LLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW on May 27, 2010. i am demanding all ORIGINAL signed contract(s) (NO 
copies), ORIGINAL security agreement(s) (NO copies), and all correspondence between 
KENNETH PIPKIN and JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW, MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, HSBC 
BANK NEVADA, N.A., and ANY other parties involved (collectively "ail parties"). I am also 
demanding correspondence (including documentation of verbal correspondence) between "al! 
parties". 
Additionally, I am demanding the name and address of the original creditor, the name and 
address of the current creditor and ANY previous, current or future creditor(s), including "all 
parties'7. 
i am also requesting the alleged Total Amount Due, as of the date a reply is mailed. 
Furthermore, as of the date of this letter, 1 am requesting copy of original allegedly rejected 
Postmarked envelope that allegedly contained original evidence previously requested on June 
18,2010. 
Please mail all documentation, contracts, correspondence and copy of allegedly rejected 
Postmarked envelope within 30 days from receipt of this letter to requestors address listed 
above. If above requested evidence is not received within 30 days, we will assume this matter is 
moot. 
Requestor cannot answer any Discovery processes until above evidence is produced. 
- %~f'T~i rtz.<TK } h 'ih-
Agent for KENNETH PIPKIN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on the 10th day of June 2011,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of Demandanfs 2nd request and demand to the Plaintiffs address below: 
William A. Mark (9602) 
JOHNSON MARK LLC ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. Box7811 
Sandy, UT 84091-7811 
%-nt;a pfCl 
Kenneth Pipkin 
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SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
* Complete items 1,2, and 3. Also complete 
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. 
m Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
• Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
1. Article Addressed to: 
3*^*1 fts+jc Uc V^^u*, 
P<6'Q(hL n&i 
Wv<v, a r g ^ f / - ? ^ , 
COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY 
A SlgniEirp7 
X 
v i/ ^ u-Hi B. RecewgcJ \$ ( fifafed Nape)/ 
u \f y tUL Mr 
D Agent 
D Addressee // 
cl 
D. Is deUvery address different irom item 1 ? D Yes 
tf YES, enter delivery address below: D No 
3. Service Type 
D Certified Mail D Express Mail 
D Registered D Return Receipt tor Mercnanaise 
D Insured Mail Q C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) D Yes 
2. Article Number 
(Transfer from service label} "TDDT H2SD 0D03 SE05 M5M2 
T*ne ^ Zo(C 
C. Date of Delivery 
PS Form 3811, February 2004 Domestic Return Receipt 102595-Q2-M-1540 
4 
h 
% 
c 
SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
m Complete items 1,2, and 3. Also complete 
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. 
• Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
B Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, 
-=or on the front If space permits. 
1. Article Addressed to: 
Mfir^cyi * f L*M 
COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY 
A, Signature^-] f~ 
x /kJkzy] D Agent D Addressee u ib 
D. Is delivery address differed from item 1? D Yes 
If YES, enter delivery address below: O No 
13. 2*i( 
3. Service Type 
D Certified Mail Q Express Mai! 
• Registered ED Return Receipt for Merchandise 
D Insured MaH Q C.O.D. 
2. Article Number 
(Transfer from service label) 
7D1D lfc?D 
4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) 
DDD5 QD65 bMbfi 
Q Y e s 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , February 2004 Domestic Return Receipt 102595-02-M-1540 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW p , , - £ ' ' TELEPHONE 
P.O. Box 7811 £ f 1^6 i* L 1-888-599-6333 
Sandy, UT 84091-7811 
lillilHHiillii Reference # 370024 
. .
 0 _ o r H n Our Client: MIDLAND FUNDING LLC 
May 27, 2010 
Original Creditor: HSBC BANK NEVADA, N.A. 
KENNETH PIPKIN 
PO BOX 842272 Please remit payment to: 
HILDALEUT 84784 Johnson Mark LLC 
P.O. Box 7811 
Sandy, UT 84091-7811 
,. _„ _ _ . ... EleaseJaetumJOapPortion With Payment- - — 
Our law firm has been retained to collect from you the Total Amount Due below: 
Account Number: 370024 
Last Charge/Paid Date: 
Account Balance: $ 6148.03 
Attorney/Collection Fee: $ 0.00 
Interest Owing: $ 557.53 
Total Amount Due: $ 6705.56 
To resolve this matter, you must either pay the Total Amount Due (unless it has already been paid) or call the law 
firm at 1-888-599-6333 and work out arrangements for payment If you do neither of these things, our client may be 
entitled to file a lawsuit against you or take further action for the collection of this debt. 
Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it If 
you do not dispute it within that period, we will assume that it is valid. If you do dispute it by notifying our firm in 
writing to that effect, we will, as required by law, obtain and mail to you proof of the debt. And if, within the same 
period, you request in writing the name and address of your original creditor, if the original creditor is different from 
the current creditor, we will furnish you with that information too. 
The law does not require our client to wait until the end of the thirty-day period before pursuing their contractual 
rights against you to collect this debt If, however, you request proof of the debt or the name and address of the 
original creditor within thethirty^day-peric^ tfaatbegins with your receipt of this JetterJtheJawrequires our firm to 
suspend our efforts to collect the debt (through a lawsuit, arbitration or otherwise) until we mail the requested 
information to you. 
At this time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular circumstances of your account, and no 
decision has been made to file a lawsuit However, if you fail to contact this office, our client may consider 
additional remedies to recover the Total Amount Due. This is an attempt to collect a debt Any information obtained 
will be used for that purpose. This communication is from a debt collector. 
As of the date of this letter, you owe the Total Amount Due shown above. Because of interest and/or other charges 
(if any, as allowed by law), which may vary from day to day, the Total Amount Due on the day you pay may be 
greater than that shown above. For a current Total Amount Due, mail us a request or call 1-888-599-6333. 
This law firm reports to a credit-reporting agency. Your failure to pay the Total Amount Due, or provide a dispute, 
may result in this account being reported as allowed by law. 
We also accept payments by Visa, Mastercard, check-by-phone (ACH), Western Union, and MoneyGram. 
To pay online visit www.payjrm.com 
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ADDENDUM 
CASES: 
CELOTEX CORP, v. CATRETT, ADMINISTRATRIX OF T H E ESTATE 
OF CATRETT, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) 
"Summary judgment is appropriate where the court is satisfied "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). The burden of establishing 
the nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on the party moving for summary judgment. 
10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727, p. 121 
(2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter Wright) (citing cases); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, 
Moorefs Federal Practice 1j 56.15[3] (2d ed, 1985) (hereinafter Moore) (citing cases). 
See also, ante, at 323; ante, at 328 (WHITE, J., concurring). This burden has two 
distinct components: an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving 
party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate burden of persuasion, which 
always remains on the moving party. See 10A Wright § 2727. The court need not 
decide whether the moving party has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion® 
unless and until the court finds that the moving party has discharged its initial *331 
burden of production. Adickesv. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157-161 (1970k 
1963 Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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626. The burden of production imposed by Rule 56 requires the moving party to 
make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment" 
Eric M. P ICHT and Shayleen M, Pieht, Plaintiffs, v. Jon R. HAWKS, George 
E . Warner and Jon R. Hawks, Ltd., Defendants., 77 F.Supp.2d 1041 (1999) 
The FDCPA is a remedial, strict liability statute which was intended to be 
applied in a liberal manner. SeeMcGoimn v. Ki/m Inc., 569 F.2d 845, 846 (5th Cir. 1 9 7 8 K 
Proof of deception or actual damages is not necessary to make a recovery under the 
FDCPA. Bakery. G.C Services Corporation, 6"?7 F.2d 775. 760 f9th Cir.1982); Rirena p. 
AL4B Colkctions, Inc.. 682 F.Supp. 174. 175 (W.DJSLY. 19681 Proof of one violation is 
sufficient to support a finding of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in an 
FDCPA action. Benflev P. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F,3d 60. 62 (2nd Cir. 1993V 
Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F.Supp. 502,. 505 (P.Conn. 1990V Whether the consumer owes the 
alleged debt has no bearing on a suit brought pursuant to the FDCPA. McCartney r. 
FimtCitv Bank 970 F.2d 45 f5th Cir.1992); Baker v. G.C Services Cort>.. 677 F.2d at 777 
i.,r '- -"? J. 
C9th Cir. 1982). Determinations of whether the debt collector's conduct has violated 
the FDCPA are made from the perspective of the "least sophisticated consumer." 
FTC r. Raladaw Co., 316 U.S. 149. 151-52. 62 S.Ct. 966. 968-69. 86 L.Ed. 1336 (1942V 
Exposition Press. Inc. i: FTC. 295 F.2d 869. 873 (2A Cir. 19611 cert, denied, 3^0 U.S. 9H. 
82 S.Ct. 1554. 8 L.Ed.2d 49^ (1962): Jeter p. CreditBurean. Inc.. 760 F.2d 1168. 1172-
1175 filth Cir.19851 
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H E I N T Z et aL v. JENKINS, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) 
There are two rather strong reasons for believing that the Act applies to the 
litigating actrvities of lawyers. First, the Act defines the "debt collector [s]ff to whom it 
applies as including those who "regularly collec[t] or attemp[t] to collect, directly or 
indirectly, [consumer] debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.11 § 
1692a(6). In ordinary English, a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of 
consumer debts through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly "attempts" to 
"collect" those consumer debts. See, e. g., Black's Law Dictionary 263 (6th ed. 1990) 
("To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by 
personal solicitation or legal proceedings"). 
Johnny STILES, Plaintiff, v. H O M E CABLE CONCEPTS, INC., et aL 
, Defendants. AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL CENTER, Plaintiff, v. 
Johnny STILES, Defendant. 994 F.Supp. 1410 (1998) 
"The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility 
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 
portions of the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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file, together with the affidavits, if any/ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact" Id. at 323. * 
If the movant succeeds in demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact, the 
burden shifts to the non-movant to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, 
that a genuine issue material to the non-movantfs case exists." 
t 
"In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented by the 
nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. 
Anderson* 477 U.S. at 255. The facts, as viewed in that light, are as follows. 
This is a satellite case. Plaintiff Johnny Stiles purchased a satellite television receiving 
system on or about January 31, 1994. To finance this purchase, Mr. Stiles appHed for a 
revolving charge account with AGFC. See Credit Application, 3-31-94, On the 
application, there are four caveats printed in bold directly above the signature line. 
One of these states that 
BY SIGNING BELOW YOU: . . . 
(3) Agree that if this application is accepted and credit is extended by American 
General Financial Center, you will be bound by the terms of the Cardholder 
Agreement attached hereto, a copy of which has been provided to you. 
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Id Mr. Stiles signed and dated the application below this statement, thereby binding 
himself to the cardholder agreement. Id 
The Cardholder Agreement establishes a number of duties for AGFQ as well as the 
credit card holder/* 
John YORGER, Plaintiff-AppeHant, v. PITTSBURGH CORNING 
CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. 733 R2d 1215 
".. .we cannot accept as an absolute requirement that a party opposing a 
motion for summary judgment must file an affidavit in order to preserve issues 
adequately mentioned in the response and elsewhere. Moreover, defendant's argument 
ignores the fundamental rule that the burdens of establishing the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact and the entitlement to judgment as a matter of law are on the 
movant. The nonmovant may not, of course, "rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings/1 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), but rather must respond. Including an 
affidavit along with the response, however, is not an absolute requirement to oppose a 
summary judgment motion, particularly where summary judgment is improper. The 
Supreme Court decided this issue in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.? 398 U.S. 144, 90 
S.Ct 1598, 26 L.£d.2d 142, wherein it held that f,[w]here the evidentiary matter in 
support of the motion [for summary judgment] does not establish the absence of a 
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiarv 
5 
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matter is presented/1 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. at 1609-1610 (footnote omitted, 
emphasis in original) (quoting Advisory Committee Note on 1963 Amendment to ! 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The Court further observed that: It has always been perilous for 
the opposing party neither to proffer any countering evidentiary materials nor file a 
56(f) affidavit. And the peril rightly continues [after the amendment to Rule 56(e) ]. 
Yet the party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that he is 
entitled to judgment under established principles; and if he does not discharge that 
burden then he is not entided to judgment. No defense to an insufficient showing is 
required. 6 j . Moore, Federal Practice p 56.22, pp. 2824-2825 (2d ed. 1966) [amended 
1982]." 
RULES: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c), Summary Judgment. Motion 
and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall he rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entided to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
intedocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e), Summary Judgment. Form of 
affidavits; further testimony; defense required, Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a 
party faiEng to file such a response. 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. 
§ 809. Validation of debts. 
(a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in 
connection with the collection of any debt a debt collector shall, 
unless the following information is contained in the initial 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the 
consumer a written notice containing— 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in 
writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion 
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the 
debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of 
such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer hv the 
debt collector; and 
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the 
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with 
the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the 
current creditor. 
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-
day period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion 
thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address 
of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the 
debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains 
verification of the debt or anv copy of a judgment, or the name and 
address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the 
consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and 
communications that do not otherwise violate this title may continue 
during the 30-day period referred to m subsection (a) unless the 
consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any 
portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name 
and address of die original creditor. Any collection activities and 
communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be 
inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the 
debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. 
Fair Debt CoUection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. 
| 813. Civil liability. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to 
comply with any provision of this title with respect to any person is liable to such 
person in an amount equal to the sum of— 
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure; 
(2) (A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as 
the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or 
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(B) in the case of a class action, 
(i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered ' 
under subparagraph (A), and 
(ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class 
members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to 
exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the 
debt collector; and 
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the 
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by 
the court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was 
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to 
the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and 
costs. 
(b) In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a), the court 
shall consider, among other relevant factors— 
(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the frequency and 
persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such 
noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional; 
or 
(2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B), the frequency and persistence 
of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the 
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resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and 
the extent to which the debt collector's noncompliance was intentional. 
(c) A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this tide if the 
debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not inten-
tional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of 
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. 
(d) An action to enforce any liability created by this tide may be brought in any 
appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, 
or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from die date on 
which the violation occurs. 
(e) No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or 
omitted in good faith in conformity widi any advisory opinion of the Commission, 
notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is 
amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other audiority to be invalid for any 
reason. 
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